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APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent brought this action to recover the balance due on certain purchases of plumbing supplies.
Appellants tendered payment of such sum but refused
to pay attorney's fees incurred in the collection of the
balance due as agreed in the invoice lists of the purchases that were signed by Respondent and their employees. Respondent maintains that the employees did
have the authority to bind the Appellants to the invoice
agreements.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court on stipulated facts.
The District Court entered Findings of Fact and Con-
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clusions of Law based on the entire record. Judgment
was entered for Respondent on the grounds that the
employees did have the authority to bind their principals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to reverse the judgment of the
lower court and to enter a judgment of no cause of
action.

1

STATE1\1ENT OF FACTS
During the period from .May to August of 1970, '
Appellants herein, Leo and J. 1\1. Bringhurst, made
various purchases from time to time of certain wholesale plumbing supplies from Respondent, B & R Supply Company. Approximately Five-Hundred Dollars
( $500.00) worth of purchases were made directly by
the Appellants and signed for by them. The remaining
purchases were made by employees of the Appellants.
The Appellants would either order the supplies by telephone and have them delivered to the job site by the
Respondent where an employee of the Appellants would
sign for them on the invoice list, or an employee of the
Appellants would pick the supplies up at Respondent's
place of business and sign for them at that time. The
Appellants admit that their employees, who were
journeymen plumbers, had the authority to pick up and
receive the supplies or purchase them on open account.
1
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Partial payment for these supplies had been made
prior to the commencement of suit by Respondent for
the balance due on these purchases totaling $1,685.01.
After suit was commenced by Respondent, the Appellants tendered the full amount owing on the balance
due. However, the Appellants refused to pay the attorney's fees that Respondent alleged were incurred in
the collection of said sum.
Respondent bases its claim to attorney's fees upon
the terms of the purchase agreement contained in the invoices wherein, among other things, it is stated in small
inconspicious print:
". . . It is agreed that all merchandise covered
by this invoice shall be paid for at the Seller's
office, Salt Lake City, Utah, within 30 days
following date hereof. Any portion of .the
pu,rchase price not so paid shall bear interest
at the rate of % of one percent per month both
before and after judgment, until paid and purchaser agrees to pay costs incident to collection
of said sums, including reasonable attorney's
fees." (pp. 9-15; Exhibits A through J of
Record)
Upon the above stipulated facts and documents of
record, the District Court of the Third Judicial District
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding, gave Judgment for
Respondent in the amount of $420.61 as attorney's fees,
plus $24.40 court costs.

4

ARGU1\1ENT
POINT I.
THE El\IPLOYEES OF THE APPELLANTS HAD NO AUTHORITY, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, TO BIND THEIR PRINCIPAL
TO THE INVOICE AGREE1"1ENT FOR PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED
IN COLLECTING THE PAST DUE PFRCHASE PRICES OF THE PLU1\1BING SUPPLIES.
In Park v. 1lfoorman 1.tlfg. Co., et al., 121 U. 339.
241 P2d 914 ( 1952), the Supreme Court of Utah,
Justice .McDonough writing the opinion for the Court,
stated the general rule with respect to the ability of
agents to perform acts incidental to their authorized
acts from .Mecham on Agency, Section 1781:
"Whenever the doing of a certain act or the
transaction of a given affair or the performance of certain business is confided to an agent,
the authority to so act will, in accordance with
a general rule often referred to, carry with it by
implication the authority to do all the collateral
acts which are the natural and ordinary incidents of the main acts or business authorized.
The speaking of words-the making of statements, representations, declarations, aclmis-
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sions, and the like, may easily be such an incident as the doing of any other sort of act."
This same general principal was again expressed
in Naujoko v. Sukrmann, 9 U.2d 84 at p. 87, 337 P2d
967 ( 1959), as a reason for binding a principal to the
incidental activities of its agents:
"The defendants having selected their employee and agent, are chargeable with responsibility for his activities and knowledge within
the scope of assigned duties and those reasonably and necessarily incident thereto."
Thus, the general rule of law emerging from these
two Utah cases is that a principal is bound by the activities of his agent that are authorized by the principal or
that are "reasonably and necessarily" or "naturally and
ordinarily" incident to the accomplishment of the authorized acts.
The stipulated facts of this case show that there
was no express authority given by Appellants to their
employees to bind them to the invoice agreement. The
Appellants only authorized their journeymen plumbers
to pick up or receive the supplies and at "no time whatsoever authorized any of the persons who signed certain
invoices, sales receipts, or the like of the plaintiff herein [Respondent], to contract on his behalf or to sign
any documents on his behalf, other than on open accounts." (Record at p. 21, Affidavit of Leo Bring-
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hurst). This express authorization to purchase supplies
did not carry with it the power to bind their principal
to the terms of the invoice agreement regarding attorney's fees, since that provision was not "reasonably and
necessarily" or "naturally and ordinarily" incident to
the authorized act of purchasing supplies, picking them
up or receiving them. In essence, the employees did not
have the implied authority to bind their principals to the
attorney's fee provision of the invoice agreements.
In Louden JJJ achinery Co. v. Day, 104 Vt. 520.
162 A 370 ( 1932) , the agent was to build a barn and
procure all necessary materials and labor for the principal. Pursuant to this, the agent ordered from plaintiff
a ventilating system, the purchase order signed in the
name of the agent and which provided the purchaser
would pay reasonable costs of collection and attorney's
fees in case of default. The Court stated:
" ... [The agent] had authority to build a barn
on the defendant's premises, and to procure the
necessary materials and labor therefor. So far
as the plaintiff is concerned his [the agent's]
powers extended no further than to purchase
on defendant's credit a ventilating system and
to fix the price to be paid. The agreed facts
are silent as to any authority, express or implied, to bind the defendant for costs and attorney's fees." (162 A 370 at p. 372)
The same essential facts or lack of them are present in this case. First, there is no express authority
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shown to bind the principal for the acts of his employees.
Second, there are no facts to show they had the implied
authority to so bind their principal in a contract of purchase, the invoice agreement as to attorney's fees was
not naturally or reasonably incident to that activity.
In Blake v. Blake, 17 U. 2d 369, 412 P2d 454
( 1966), the Court stated the general rule that "attorney's fees are not recoverable as damages in either actions on contracts or in torts if there is no statutory or
contractual authority for such fees," citing Kidman v.

White, 14 U.2d 142, 378 P2d 898 ( 1963) ) ; et. al. This
shows that in contract and tort actions attorney's fee
awards are the exception rather than the rule. They are
not reasonable unless one of the two preceding conditions are present. Thus, in order for an agent to be able
to bind his principal to such agreements he should have
that express power given to him by the principal since
attorney's fees are not normally awarded to successful
litigants absent express authority (contract or statute)
therefor. In many instances in the present case the employees were journeymen plumbers doing labor at the
job site and merely signed for receipt of the supplies.
This does not create the express or implied authority
to bind the principal to unusual damages and costs since
these are not incidental and normal recoveries under
contract actions; and the same argument holds true for
the pick-up purchases by the employees at Respondent's
place of business.
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CONCLUSION
Appellants' employees had no authority, express
or implied, to bind the Appellants to the agreement in
the invoice lists to pay for reasonable attorney's fees.
Therefore, Judgment of the District Court should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN L. McCOY
RYBERG, McCOY &
HALGREN
325 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants

